On the start of a new project in the Philippines...

Typically, in ethnographic research, we seek depth ‘in place’ – a long-term, situated understanding of a singular, geographically delimited place. As the discipline has evolved, this idea has had to change – the ‘field’ can be a lot of things these days.

My dissertation aims to combine depth of place with multi-sitedness, meaning that I use ethnographic methods in several geographically dispersed locations. This is around a common effort - exploring information security in the context of climate activism (as part of a broader effort to potentially unsettle some core cryptographic foundations). Working this way is really at odds with pure anthropology, which seeks rich and complex explanations of a culture only in and of itself. Comparison is an analytically complicated tool in ethnography, and generalisation is almost always seen as a simplification.

The pursuit of multi-sitedness with ‘sociotechnical’ intentions confronts me with a methodologically complicated landscape. In particular, pursuing multi-sitedness with climate activists (who are not part of the same transnational group) in the UK and the Philippines requires some thought. It is important though that I explore climate activist groups only (rather than comparing different types of activism), since as explained in a different blog post, climate activism generates unique security dynamics that are exclusive to the movement. Having a common foundation is important when combining sites.

Before thinking about combining sites, there is a more immediate question - why the Philippines? I have been asked this question innumerable times. There really are a number of reasons why the Philippines is an important space to explore climate activism and security (both informational and beyond). I have been pursuing my thesis work here, and am currently in the first phase of the project - remote interviews.

I have been interviewing activists remotely for a few weeks now. I plan to go to Cebu City (and the surrounding area) for a month this summer to do some face-to-face interviews. I also plan to return for several months next year. In preparation for these visits, the remote interviews I have conducted have allowed me to understand some of the high-level security concerns of grassroots groups in the Philippines.

In conducting remote interviews as part of an initial phase of this project, I have asked myself three key questions:

  1. What is the landscape of advocacy and information security in this context?
  2. How will this site interact conceptually with existing work I have done on climate activism in the UK?
  3. What sorts of things do groups and individuals feel would be most useful for me to work with them on?

I will now briefly summarise some contextual notes on what the Philippines offers in terms of understanding digital security/social movements, as described by interviewees (with some brief sentiments in the headers) –

“We try joining together but it is hard.”

There is no single big climate activist group in the Philippines; instead, there is a diverse range of medium and small groups that often work together. Numerous coalitions facilitate this collaboration, with some activists belonging to 5 or even 10 groups/coalitions. It is hard to speak about actvism ‘in the Philippines’, since the country is incredibly diverse and features stark urban/rural divides. In terms of environmental conerns, different provinces, regions, and collections of islands are concerned with radically different things.

Why are there not one or two big groups (like we see in the UK)? According to one participant, there is an interest in uniting the landscape to have a stronger voice, but groups often lack resources and similar priorities. Issues of scale also come to the fore, with some groups preferring local struggles and others taking on transnational (regional or global) issues. Local forms of activism in the Philippines are just that, local struggles over land. More globalised or transnational groups take on broader, more global issues. Therefore, with a variety of smaller groups working together, there is no one way to ‘do information security’, leading to ad hoc security practices that do not always map onto each other. As someone interested in networks, the complexity of this network, particularly in terms of scale, is fascinating.

In addition, while many groups meet in-person when activists live close by, a significant amount of organising is done online. This is exacerbated by the fact that some groups work regionally or nationally, spanning many different islands. One participant explained that the Philippines is a “country of digital citizens.” This is an important foundation for working on digital security strategy.

“Everything is about land.”

When we think about activism, the first thing that comes to mind for many people is protesting. It is really the case everywhere that we see activism as much more than just protesting. People I have talked to so far in the Philippines have emphasised this - that there are many forms of ‘activism beyond the streets’. Different methods of collective action require different practices of information security, and so for people involved in different things, their ideas of security may combine or conflict.

One participant defined climate activism in the Philippines in terms of three broad categories. The first is “activists who take to the streets”. The second is “activists who are more artistic or express themselves at the political level”. And then there are the land defenders, who are “different from the other types” because they are involved in specific anti-extractivist campaigns. There are five types of land defenders in the Philippines, roughly indigenous peoples, farmers/agricultural workers, activists, lawyers/judges, and conservation officers, meaning that many people doing this work would not consider themselves activists per se, as they are essentially trying to protect their livelihoods, but face intense threats related to the broader movement, meaning that ideas of collective security are relevant here, but can split significantly as groups have different essential goals in terms of their advocacy.

Other forms of activism (e.g. mass mobilisations, small-scale protests, political activism, creative activism) also take on a similar ethos that climate activism is not just ‘for the climate’ but also defends livelihoods, workers and the connected lives of people and land. With different understandings of what constitutes climate activism and what needs to be protected, security manifests itself in very different ways.

“Security involves everybody.”

Despite which types of activism they took part in most, interviewees told me that about the generalised fears associated with activism, meaning that security is relevant for all activists, despite their methods. I have been told that land defending is largely perceived by the public and government as a radical communist activity, making it the most dangerous form of activism in terms of arrest and death (given that there is an armed wing of the communist party in the Philippines that you can be mistakenly affilated with). Therefore, being a land defender carries a risk of being ‘red-tagged’, a process that Ferdinand Marcos introduced during periods of martial law several decades ago. To be red-tagged is to be added to a government database, and then arrested / killed extrajudicially. Therefore, the stakes are high.

Some more context for generalised fears is the Anti-Terror Law of 2020, which was a culmination of many years of tightening legislation surrounding extremism. The 18th Congress passed the ATL in 2020 under Rodrigo Duterte, who expanded the definition of what it means to be an extremist. While Duterte is no longer in power, one participant told me that the structures that he introduced, and the cultural impact, endures. The law was petitioned 37 times, making it the most assailed piece of legislation in Philippines history. Duterte specified in the definition in response that “advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights” shall not be considered as terrorist acts only if they do not present a risk to public safety. Therefore, protest is not illegal (it is a constitutional right, which is important for information secuirty, as some legal protective mechanisms should exist for parties to strategise with) - but the reality is that certain forms of activism are thought of as terrorism under this new definition. At least 1734 killings of environmental and land defenders took place in a total of 53 countries between 2002 and 2018, most of them occurring in Brazil, the Philippines, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Peru (with 77% of land defender killings occurring in these 6 countries).

With the ATL as the context, all other forms of protest and advocacy are also dangerous but are not considered to be extremist from a legal standpoint. The risks that protesting (both mass mobilisation and smaller scale stuff) carries are related to violent dispersion and “letting the police know that you exist”. Protesting without a permit is grounds for arrest, and involvement in nonviolent direct action (NVDA) can also lead to arrest. Participants explained that being arrested is undesirable, given that being seen as involved in illegal activity could potentially undermine the entire movement. While one might assume that people who take part in ‘less radical’ forms of activism act in less secure ways, this does not seem as true in the Philippines. All activists, regardless of methods used, fear their safety - meaning that “security involves everybody”, regardless of methods.

“It matters.”

On a broader note, the Philippines is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to the effects of climate change, despite contributing little. Therefore, this advocacy does not exist in a bubble, it does not exist in the abstract. It is felt, and is unlikely to go away despite legislative changes and threat. On a fundamental level, security here is more than just information security or operational security, there is insecurity in terms of life, livelihood, and the future.

There is a lot that I want to write here but I fear it will get too long. Moving forward, I am continuing to interview organisers and campaigners remotely (while also continuing with my UK-based work concurrently), and then in July I will be in Cebu City (and beyond). I am really looking forward to it all.




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